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Case No. 20080419-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Brandon Lee Sandoval, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first degree 
felony; theft, a second degree felony; and criminal mischief, a third degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err by instructing the jury that a conviction may rest on the 
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, where that instruction was 
immediately followed by a Long instruction emphasizing the fallibility of eyewitness 
testimony? 
Standard of Review. This Court "review [s] the propriety of jury instructions for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court/7 Orem City v. Longoria, 2008 UT 
App 168, \ 3,186 P3d 958. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and rules are attached at Addendum 
A: 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (due process); 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (due process); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (jury instructions). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and co-defendant Joshua Phillips were each charged with one 
count each of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; theft, a second degree 
felony; and criminal mischief, a third degree felony (R, 26-27). Before trial, 
Defendant filed a Notice of Alibi (R. 33-34). 
At trial, Defendant objected to a jury instruction that "[a] conviction can be 
based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness" (R. 163 (Jury Instr. 
56); R. 233:282-85). The trial court overruled Defendant's objection, but immediately 
followed the challenged instruction with a Long eyewitness testimony instruction (R. 
163-66 (Jury Instr. 56-57); 234:5).l 
The jury convicted both Defendant and Phillips as charged (R. 235:7). The 
trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of five-years-to-life for 
aggravated burglary, one-to-fifteen years for theft, and zero-to-five years for 
1
 A complete copy of the jury instructions is attached at Addendum B. 
2 
criminal mischief (R. 190-92). The court then suspended Defendant's sentences, 
placed him on 36 months' probation, and ordered him to serve 365 days in jail, with 
credit for time served (Id.). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 193-94). The Utah Supreme Court transferred 
the case to this Court for disposition (R. 203,217). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Friday, November 3,2006,26-year-old Creed Law had just broken up with 
his wife (R. 232:43-44; R. 233:55-56, 224). To cheer him up, his friend Dave Brown 
took him to a local bar to play pool (R. 232:43; R. 233:224). When the bar closed, 
Creed invited Dave and a few other people to his parents' house to hang out (R. 
232:44, 229). Creed's parents were away for the weekend (R. 233:229). But Creed 
made sure it was okay with his brother Porter, a medical student who was staying at 
their parents' house while he studied for exams (R. 233:53-54, 237). 
When Creed's friends arrived, they were joined by five people Creed did not 
know (R. 232:45). Dave had invited his friend Heidi to the house (R. 232:45; R. 
233:28). Along with her mother and her mother's male companion, Heidi had 
invited Defendant and co-defendant Phillips (R. 232:45). 
Although Creed never asked Defendant and Phillips to leave, he was not 
completely comfortable with them (R. 232:77,91,138). They wore gang-type clothes 
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and did not mingle much (R. 232:69-71, 78-80,138). Thus, over the course of the 
party, Creed kept an eye on them (R. 233:221). 
When they first arrived, the group hung out on the main floor of the house, 
mainly in the kitchen and sunroom that led to the back yard (R. 232:48; R. 233:56, 
215). At one point, Creed and Dave took Heidi and her mother on a tour of the 
house (R. 232:82-83; R. 233:58,210-11). The master bedroom- which included a flat 
screen television hung on the wall — was nice and neat, just as Creed's parents had 
left it (R. 233:59, 212). 
After about a half hour, the group moved to the game room downstairs, 
which included a pool table and other games (R. 232:45; R. 233:56, 212, 216). 
Afterwards, Creed saw Defendant poking around near the front door on the main 
level (R. 232:89-91). Creed thought Defendant was just lost, and redirected him to 
the downstairs (R. 232:126). 
The party lasted two to three hours (R. 232:61). During that time, Creed and 
Dave played a couple of games of pool with Defendant and Phillips (R. 232:50, 61, 
80; R. 233:38, 63,213). While playing, Creed and Dave discussed plans to go on an 
overnight motor biking trip with Porter when they woke up the next morning (R. 
232:50, 87, 143; R. 233:212-13). The plan was to head down to Cedar City (R. 
232:143). Dave was not sure whether he would join them (R. 232:143; R. 233:212). 
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About 3:00 a.m., the party started winding down (R. 232:49; R. 233:216). 
Because neither Defendant nor Phillips had transportation, Dave agreed to drive 
them home (R. 232:129; R. 233:215-16). Dave dropped them off at a home about 10 
to 15 minutes away from the party (R. 233:216). 
A few hours later, at about noon on Saturday, November 4, Creed and Porter 
went riding as planned (R. 232:35; R. 233:65,103). But instead of doing an overnight 
trip to Cedar City, the brothers headed to western Utah for a day trip (R. 232:35; R. 
233:65,104). When they returned to their parents' house around 6:00 p.m., Creed 
dropped Porter off with plans to return later to help Porter clean the bikes (R. 
232:35, 92). 
Porter, who was "totally dead tired" after the late night and day of biking, 
took a shower and went to bed in the attic room in which he was staying (R. 232:133; 
R. 233:60,65-66,108). At one point, Porter, a heavy sleeper, awoke groggily to some 
noise in the house (R. 233:66-67,107-09). He assumed that it was just Creed and 
went back to sleep (R. 233:66-67). But around 9:00 p.m., Porter heard Creed's diesel 
truck pulling up (R. 232:34, 95; R. 233:65, 67). Porter was surprised, because he 
thought Creed was already there (R. 233:65, 67). Porter started getting dressed to 
see what was up (R. 233:68). 
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As he pulled into his parents' driveway, Creed saw a man crouching behind 
the bushes in his parents' backyard (R. 232:36,93). Thinking it was Porter trying to 
scare him, Creed went around the front of the house to surprise his brother from 
behind (R. 232:36-38, 93). 
But when Creed reached the back yard, he saw two men, one about 10 feet 
away, the other about 20 feet (R. 232:37-39). Creed recognized the front man as 
Defendant (R. 232:97). Defendant immediately crouched down, as would a 
linebacker in football (R. 232:39-40). In response, Creed rushed to tackle Defendant 
(R. 232:40). For the next few seconds, Creed and Defendant wrestled, until they fell 
onto some bushes (R. 232:41, 98). Creed landed on his back on the bottom (R. 
232:41,98). Defendant, also on his back, landed on top of Creed (R. 232:98). 
As the two lay almost cheek to cheek, Creed noticed the second man—whom 
he recognized as Phillips - about 10 feet away (R. 232:41-42,104). Phillips pulled 
something from his belt area and pointed it at Creed (R. 232:41,104-05). Thinking 
Phillips had a gun, Creed let go of Defendant and told the two men to take whatever 
they wanted (R. 232:41). As Defendant started to get up, Creed heard a gun shot (R. 
6 
232:41, 107). Creed played dead as the two men grabbed what looked like plastic 
shopping bags and fled (R. 232:41,107,110).2 
Creed immediately but unsuccessfully tried to use his cell phone to call the 
police (R. 232:42, 111). Creed then headed toward the house (R. 232:112). As he did, 
he saw his brother Porter coming toward him (R. 232:42,112; R. 233:69-70). Shaken 
and extremely upset, Creed told Porter they had just been robbed by the two men 
who had been at the party the previous night (R. 232:51,113; R. 233:70, 73). 
Together, Creed and Porter raced to their parents' bedroom, where their 
father kept his guns (R. 232:52-53; R. 233:71). The bedroom "was a wreck" (R. 
232:55, 119; R. 233:71, 230). The television had been broken from the wall and 
smashed (R. 232:55, 119; R. 233:232). Bureau drawers had been ransacked (R. 
232:120). And their mother's jewelry boxes and cabinets had been emptied (R. 
233:230). A closet near the front door had also been ransacked (R. 232:142; R. 
233:230). Finally, a sliding glass door to the backyard was slightly opened (R. 
232:51). The door, which was never used, was usually kept shut with a dowel (R. 
232:51,142). The dowel, however, had been removed (R. 232:51; R. 233:78, 96, 111, 
232). 
Creed's brother, Porter, also heard the gun shot, as did two of the Laws' 
neighbors (R. 233:68, 99,117,123). 
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As Creed called the police from his parents' phone, Porter grabbed one of his 
father's guns and checked the rest of the house to make sure it was clear (R. 232:53, 
114; R. 233:73-74). Porter noticed that all the lights in the house had been turned on; 
as he went through the house, Porter shut off the lights so that, if the robbers 
remained outside, they would not be able to see him (R. 232:53; R. 233:74). 
At about 10:00 p.m., after calling the police, Creed called his parents, and, 
apologizing continuously, told them what had happened (R. 233:229). Creed's 
parents, Dennis and Kaley, immediately started back home (R. 233:229). 
Creed then called Dave to try to get contact information on Defendant and 
Phillips (R. 233:73-74,214). Dave, in turn, called Heidi (R. 233:30,42-43,215). And 
Heidi, in turn, called Phillips and told him that he and Defendant were suspects in 
the burglary (R. 233:30,42-43). 
When police arrived at the Law home, Creed immediately identified 
Defendant and Phillips as the burglars, described what they wore, and gave the 
officers their contact information (R. 232:126-27). The police observed the damaged 
hedges where Creed said he had wrestled with Defendant (R. 133:129). In addition, 
they found a shiny .45-caliber semi-automatic casing about 20 feet from those 
hedges (R. 233:132,135,140). 
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While still at the Law home, police contacted Phillips and told him to stay 
home because they needed to speak with him (R. 233:80,180,215). For some reason, 
however, the police decided not to make contact with Phillips that night (R. 233:80, 
179,183-84). A lead investigator was not assigned the case until three days later (R. 
233:172). 
Dennis and Kaley Law returned home around 3:30 a.m. the morning after the 
burglary (R. 233:229). As he surveyed his property, Dennis noticed two of his 
duffle-type bags filled with his personal property next to each other in the 
neighbor's yard (R. 232:115,118; 233:10-11,162,233-35). He also noticed footprints 
in the mud in front of his house that led to his back yard (R. 233:232-35). Dennis 
pointed both out to the police (R. 233:236). 
Creed later identified both Defendant and Phillips in photographic lineups (R. 
232:63-64; R. 233:173). He also identified Defendant in a live lineup (R. 232:65). 
At trial, Creed Law testified that he had spent approximately two to three 
hours with Defendant and co-defendant Phillips at his parents7 house during the 
wee morning hours of November 4 (R. 232:61). During that time, Creed played pool 
with them a couple of times (R. 232:50, 61, 80). And, because he was concerned 
about their presence in his parents' home, he kept an eye on them throughout their 
visit (R. 233:221). 
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Creed further testified that when he confronted the two men in his backyard 
on the night of November 4, in addition to all the lights in the house being on, all the 
lights in the backyard were on—including two porch lights, a motion-detector light, 
and several other lights (R. 232:62, 127).3 Moreover, Creed observed Defendant 
when Defendant was just ten feet away from him and again when they were on the 
ground cheek-to-cheek (R. 232:41-42,97). And he observed Phillips from about ten 
feet away when Phillips was standing over him and Defendant as they lay in the 
bushes (R. 232:41-42,103). 
The defense. Defendant's defense at trial was three-fold. First, Defendant 
challenged the reliability of Creed Law's eyewitness testimony. As part of that 
strategy, Defendant directed the jury to the Long instruction (R. 234:17). He then 
3
 In his brief, defendant challenges the reliability of Creed's eyewitness 
testimony "because it exhibits many features that diminish its accuracy," including 
that it was "[i]t was 'completely dark' outside" when Creed confronted defendant 
and Phillips. Aplt. Br. at 32 (citing R. 233:119). In support of that contention, 
defendant cites the testimony of a neighbor of the Laws who heard the gunshot on 
the night of the burglary (R. 233:119). That neighbor, however, never testified that it 
was "completely dark" in the Laws' yard when the burglary occurred. The 
neighbor testified that, because of trees, he could not "see down into the [Laws'] 
property," and, thus, could not testify as to the lighting in the Laws' yard at the time 
of the burglary (R. 232:118). But more importantly, as to the natural lighting, the 
neighbor did not testify that it was "completely dark," but, rather, that "[i]t wasn't 
completely dark" (R. 232:119) (emphasis added). 
By the time the police observed the area, however, it "was not lighted and 
very dark" (R. 233:134). 
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argued that the lighting in the Laws7 back yard at the time of the confrontation, 
combined with Creed's excitement and fear over the situation and the fact that one 
of the assailants was of a different race, affected Creed's ability to identify his 
attackers (R. 234:17-23). Defendant also argued that Creed's discomfort with him 
and Phillips the night before had colored Creed's identification of them as his 
assailants (R. 234:19). 
Defendant second focused on the less-than-perfect investigation by police. 
Defendant highlighted the police department's failure to investigate Defendant and 
Phillips on the night of the burglary (R. 233:179,181,183-85;R. 234:25,27-28). And 
he highlighted the police department's failure to follow up on evidence — 
particularly muddy footprints found in the Laws' yard the day after the burglary 
and evidence that a third party had used Dennis Law's credit card and cashed some 
checks (R. 233:176).4 
Finally, Defendant presented an alibi defense. In support, Defendant 
presented evidence on cross-examination that Heidi, the woman who had originally 
4
 The lead investigator testified that the third party, a David Winfrey, had 
been arrested in Idaho on check forgery charges (R. 233:176-77). However, when the 
investigator contacted Idaho officials, he was informed that Winfrey was not being 
cooperative (R. 233:206-07). The investigator further testified that, in his experience, 
the people who stole credit cards are usually not the ones found using them (R, 
233:177). 
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invited him and Phillips to the Law house on November 3, was best friends with 
Phillips, had known him for a long time, and did not believe he was capable of 
committing the burglary (R. 233:31, 45). 
Defendant also called Glen Johnson, the former fiance of Phillips' mother, 
who had known Phillips "all of his life" (R. 233:243,274,287). Johnson testified that 
he was at the Phillips' home on November 4, 2006 (R. 233:245). According to 
Johnson, he "stayed there from Friday, or whatever it was, the fourth, until Sunday" 
(R. 233:246). Johnson testified that neither Phillips nor Defendant had a car, and that 
both of them were in the home the entire night of the day he arrived (R. 233:248-49). 
In addition, neither Phillips nor Defendant used the telephone while he was there 
(R. 233:256). 
Neither Heidi nor Glen, however, were strong witnesses for Defendant. For 
example, Heidi testified that, although she had known Phillips for a long time, she 
had only met Defendant for the first time on November 3, the Friday before the 
burglary (R. 233:174). Moreover, although Heidi testified that neither Phillips nor 
Defendant had a car (implying they had no transportation with which to complete 
the burglary), she also testified that Phillips and Defendant were nevertheless able 
to find their own transportation to the bar from which everyone had gone to the 
Law residence on November 3 (R. 233:32, 34), And Heidi acknowledged that, 
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although she, Phillips, and Defendant had gone to the bar that night, all of them 
were in fact underaged (R. 233:46-47). 
In addition, Heidi testified that she had talked with Phillips around 11:00 a.m. 
and then again around 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 4, the night of the burglary 
(R. 233:30,42). Both times, Heidi said, Phillips told her that Dave had invited them 
back to the Law house that day and asked if she was going to go back (R. 233:30,42). 
Dave, however, denied ever inviting anyone back to the Laws' house (R. 233:226). 
Finally, Heidi insisted that Phillips had called her on her cell phone 
repeatedly from his home on the night of the burglary (R. 233:30,49). Yet, Heidi's 
cell phone records belied her claim, showing a gap in contact between 7:52 p.m. and 
11 p.m. that night, exactly when the burglary occurred (R. 233:49-50). 
Johnson, meanwhile, was adamant that Phillips and Defendant never left 
Phillips7 house on November 4 (R. 233:246,248-49,265,268). But he also admitted 
that he did not"remember what day the fourth was on" (R. 233:245,254). Then, on 
cross-examination, Johnson testified that he went to the Phillips home for his 
birthday but could not testify definitively on what day of the week his birthday fell 
in 2006 (R. 233:245). 
Moreover, Johnson initially testified that he arrived on a Friday and left on 
Sunday (R. 233:253). When the prosecutor pointed out that Friday would have been 
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November 3, Johnson said that he had arrived on "the 4th, whatever day that was" 
(R. 233:253). Yet, even as Johnson continued to testify that he arrived at Phillips' 
home on Saturday, November 4, he insisted that he had stayed two nights at the 
Phillips home and had left on Sunday (R. 233:254). 
Johnson also testified that, when he arrived at the Phillips home about 5:30 
p.m. that day, both Defendant and Phillips were there, as was Phillips' mother (R. 
233:254). However, according to Johnson, Phillips' mother then left for the night to 
watch her daughter's children and did not return until noon the next day (R. 
233:254-55, 257). Johnson would have known if she had returned, he testified, 
because he spent all the time on the couch and "[t]he door is only five feet away 
from the couch" (R. 233:257). Yet, Phillips' mother testified that she came home 
from her daughter's house shortly after 11:00 p.m., as soon as she learned her son 
was suspected in the burglary (R. 233:271-72, 276). 
In addition, after testifying that neither Phillips nor Defendant had left on the 
night he had arrived at the Phillips home, which Johnson insisted was November 4, 
Johnson also testified that "[tjhey left Saturday night for a while" (R. 233:258; see also 
R. 233:249). When informed that Saturday night would have been November 4, 
Johnson said, "No" and then said, "I think it was Saturday. I'm not sure" (R. 
14 
233:258). According to Johnson, it was "the next day after they were accused of 
doing whatever" (R. 233:260). 
Also, despite evidence that Phillips had called Heidi twice on Saturday, 
November 4, from his home, Johnson did not recall Phillips or anyone else using the 
telephone that night (R. 233:256,265). And, although both Heidi and the police had 
called Phillips at his home on the night of November 4 to inform him that he was a 
suspect in the Law burglary and although Phillips7 mother testified that she 
returned to her home on November 4 as soon as she found out that Phillips was a 
suspect, Johnson testified that he did not learn that Phillips and Defendant had been 
accused of the crime until "[a] couple weeks later" (R. 233:259). 
Finally, Johnson smelled strongly of alcohol while he was on the witness 
stand (R. 233:251, 267). On cross-examination, Johnson admitted having drunk a 
pint of vodka the night before (R. 233:251). He also admitted that he had drunk 
three beers on the night he arrived at the Phillips home at the time of the burglary 
(R. 233:255). 
Jury instructions and deliberations. At the close of trial, the court gave the 
following jury instructions relevant to this appeal. 
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Instruction 1 directed the jury that "There will be many instructions. All are 
equally important. Don't pick out one and ignore the rest. Think about each 
instruction in the context of all the others" (R. 124). 
Instruction 3 directed the jury that it is the court's role to "instruct the jury on 
the LAW that it must apply" (R. 125). The instruction also directed the jury that 
"[i]t is your role as the jury to follow th[e] law and decide the factual issues. Factual 
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things 
concerning which evidence will be presented" (Id.). The instruction concluded with 
the admonition to "Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the 
case, because that is your role. . . . [Y]ou decide the case based upon the law 
explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court" (Id.). 
Instruction 6 directed the jury that "You must decide whether the charge 
against the Defendant has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt Your verdict 
must be based only on the evidence produced here in court" (R. 126). 
Instruction 11 directed the jury that "[o]nce evidence is admitted, you must 
decide three things about it: Whether it should be believed, how important it is, and 
what you can infer or conclude from it" (R. 128). The instruction continued, "Use 
your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions" and 
"[r]eview all the evidence" (R. 129). 
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Instruction 12 directed the jury that, "As each witness testifies, you must 
decide how accurate that testimony is" (Id.). The instruction further directed the 
jury that, in deciding "how accurate [a witness's] testimony is," the jury could 
consider the witness's "personal interest," "other bias," "demeanor," "consistency," 
and "knowledge and memory," as well as whether the testimony was "reasonable 
in light of human experience" (Id.) (capitalization omitted). The instruction 
concluded, "You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled 
to believe one witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with 
your honest convictions" (Id.). 
Instructions 15,16,17,18, and 29 specifically addressed the State's burden to 
prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 130-31,136). Instruction 15 
directed the jury that "defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 130). Instruction 16 directed the jury that, before it 
could give up that presumption, it must "be convinced that the defendant's guilt has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt" (Id.). Instructions 17 and 18 addressed 
"what is a reasonable doubt" and "how to evaluate doubt" (R. 131). And 
Instruction 29 again addressed reasonable doubt and instructed the jury that 
"[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the 
defendant's guilt" (R. 136). 
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Instruction 55 addressed Defendant's alibi defense (R. 162). The instruction 
directed the jury that defendant was not required to establish an alibi "by a 
preponderance or greater weight of evidence" (Id.). Rather, if Defendant brought 
"forward some substantial evidence which tends to show that he was not present at 
the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense" and "if such evidence 
when considered in connection with all other evidence in this case raises a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt you must acquit him" (Id.). 
Instruction 56 directed the jury that "[a] conviction can be based on the 
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness" (R. 163). 
Instruction 57, a Long instruction, then directed the jury that: 
An important question in this case is the identification of the 
defendant as the person who committed the crime. The prosecution 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the 
crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the person who 
committed the crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard 
from both sides, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the identification 
witness was not insincere (sic), but merely that the witness was 
mistaken in his or her belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering 
whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you should 
consider the following: 
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1. Did the witness have an opportunity to observe the 
criminal actor? In answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor; 
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of 
the witness to observe the person committing the 
crime. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime? In answering this question, you should 
consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) fatigue or injury. 
3. Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal 
actor. Identification by a person of a different race may be less reliable 
than identification by a person of the same race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the witness 
completely the product of the witness7 own memory? In answering 
this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the original 
observation of the witness and the identification of the defendant 
by the witness; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness 
at the time of the identification; 
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to 
photographs, or to any other information or influence that may 
have affected the independence of the identification of the 
defendant by the witness; 
(d) any instance when the witness failed to identify the 
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defendant; 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description 
of the actor that is inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is generally 
more reliable that an identification made from the defendant being 
presented alone to the witness 
You may also take into account that identifications made from 
seeing the person are generally more reliable than identifications made 
from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the 
prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the eyewitness 
testimony in light of the considerations listed above, you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime charged, and you find all of the other elements of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
guilty of the crime charged. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime 
charged you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime charged. 
(R. 164-66). 
During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the trial court asking," Where 
are the outside lights in the yard where the fight was located?" (R. 234:58).5 After 
5
 Copies of the jury questions and the court's responses are included in the 
record but are not numbered. They are included in the documents attached to the 
left-hand side of the record's pleadings file, immediately following a copy of 
defendant's proposed jury instructions. Copies of the questions and answers are 
attached at Addendum C. 
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conferring with counsel, the court responded,"You must tely upon the evidence or 
lack of evidence received in court. The Court cannot supplement it" (Addendum 
Q. 
The jury then sent a second question to the court, asking "Do we have to 
consider any of the factors for which there is no evidence?77 (R. 234:61). After noting 
that the jury's question probably related to the factors in the Long instruction and 
then conferring with counsel, the court responded, "You should consider the totality 
of the evidence and apply it to the factors and give what weight it deserves, if any. 
To the extent you find no evidence as to a factor, you need not consider that factor 
in your deliberations77 (R. 234:61-69). 
At the close of the day, the jury was excused for the weekend (R. 234:70-71). 
Before continuing its deliberations the following Tuesday, the trial court noted that 
it had "some notes from the jury77 (R. 235:3). The first asked, "Can lack of evidence 
be considered when substantiating doubt?77 (Addendum C). The second asked, "If 
there is doubt are we or are we not required to give the defendants the benefit of the 
doubt?77 (Addendum C). To both these questions, the court responded orally that 
"Your instructions associated with reasonable doubt are the instructions you should 
refer to in answering this question77 (R. 235:4). The court's written response was 
"Please refer to your instructions on reasonable doubt77 (Addendum C). 
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In open court, the court then provided with the jury with "a few additional 
comments I would like you to consider" while the jury continued its deliberations: 
Those for conviction ought seriously to ask themselves again, 
and most thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reason to doubt the 
correctness of a judgment that is not shared by one or more of their 
fellow jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and 
sufficiency of evidence that has failed to convince one or more of their 
fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt. And those for acquittal ought 
seriously to ask themselves again, and most thoughtfully, whether the 
doubt in their mind is a reasonable one since it appears to make no 
effective impression on the minds of one or more equally conscientious 
fellow jurors, who bear the same responsibility, serve under the same 
oath, and have heard the same evidence with, we may assume, the 
same attention to detail and desire to arrive at the truth. 
You should, however, all bear in mind at all times that no juror is 
expected to, or should, yield a conscientious conviction that he or she 
may have as to the weight of the evidence. But, it is your duty to reach 
a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious 
conviction. 
(R. 165, Jury Instr. 58; R. 235:4-5). The court concluded that the jury could "be as 
leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require and should take all the 
time that you feel may be necessary" (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error when issued 
Jury Instruction 56, which directed the jury that "[a] conviction can be based on the 
uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness." In asserting his claim, Defendant 
does not argue that the instruction was an inaccurate statement of law. Rather, 
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Defendant asserts that the instruction unduly bolstered Creed Law's eyewitness 
testimony, which was the only direct evidence of Defendant's guilt. 
When reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, this Court will not consider 
challenged instructions in isolation. Rather, jury instructions are considered as a 
whole to determine their adequacy. And this Court will affirm a trial court's jury 
instructions so long as the instructions as a whole fairly tender the case to the jury. 
In this case, the jury instructions as a whole fairly tendered the case to the 
jury. Moreover, the jury's questions during deliberations reflect that the jury 
considered the instructions as a whole before rendering its verdicts. Thus, 
Defendant's claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY THAT A CONVICTION MAY REST ON THE 
UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE 
EYEWITNESS, WHERE THAT INSTRUCTION WAS 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A LONG INSTRUCTION 
EMPHASIZING THE FALLIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY 
Defendant claims the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed 
the jury that '"[a] conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a 
single eyewitness.'" Aplt. Br. at 25 (quoting R. 163). Defendant argues that, because 
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Creed Law was the only witness to give eyewitness testimony, the instruction 
served to "unduly emphasize]] and bolster[] Creed Law's testimony/' Id. at 31. 
Thus, Defendant asserts, the instruction "undermined whatever little protection the 
Long instruction normally gives" against "jurors' natural inclination to give 
eyewitness testimony 'great weight' despite its 'deep and generally unperceived 
flaws.'" Id. at 30 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 & n.5 (Utah 1986)). The 
instruction was prejudicial, Defendant concludes, because "Creed's testimony was 
the only direct evidence that linked [Defendant] to the burglary" and other evidence 
of Defendant's guilt was weak. Id. at 31. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. Law governing jury instructions. 
At a criminal jury trial, the jury has the "exclusive prerogative to judge the 
evidence and to determine the facts." State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193,196-97 & n.8 
(Utah 1976); accord State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40,1 22,116 P.3d 360. Consequently, a 
trial court's jury instructions may neither "purport to tell the jury either what the 
evidence is or what the facts are," Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d at 197, nor "comment[] on the 
quality or credibility of the evidence in such a way as to indicate that [the court] 
favors the claims or the position of either party," State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354,496 
R2d 270, 275 (1972). 
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A trial court does, however, "ha[ve] a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant 
law." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, f 27,192 P.2d 867 (quoting State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 
421,428 (Utah 1986)). The court's instructions should "set forth the issues and the 
law applicable thereto in a clear, concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will 
understand how to discharge its responsibilities." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 696 
(Utah 1980). And, in doing so, the instructions should express the law "in abstract 
generality." Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d at 197. 
On review, '"[j]ury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to determine 
their adequacy/" State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27,131,64 P.3d 1218 (quoting State v. 
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 13,18 P.3d 1123); accord Taylor, 2005 UT 40, If 24; State v. 
Harper, 2006 UT App 178,114,136 P.3d 1261. Thus, this Court will not "isolate^ 
one sentence in one instruction while disregarding admonitions conveyed by other 
instructions." Taylor, 2005 UT 40, % 24. And "[j]ury instructions will be affirmed 
"when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the case to the jury [even 
where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as full or accurate as 
they might have been/" Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, % 31 (quoting Garcia, 2001 UT App 
19,113) (additional quotations and citations omitted) (second alteration in original). 
Finally, not every erroneous jury instruction warrants reversal of a criminal 
conviction. Rather, to warrant reversal, Defendant must affirmatively show that he 
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was prejudiced by the instruction. See State v. Gonzalez, 2002 UT App 256, % 20,56 
P.3d 969 (refusing to find reversible error in jury instruction where defendant 
wanted court "to assume prejudice"). An erroneous instruction is prejudicial only 
"if it is 'of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the defendant/" Low, 2008 UT 58, | 43 (citation omitted). 
B. Where the jury instructions as a whole instructed the jury on 
witness credibility, reasonable doubt, and the fallibility of 
eyewitness testimony, Instruction 56 was not prejudicial error. 
Defendant acknowledges that Instruction 56 correctly states the law. See Aplt. 
Br. at 26 (acknowledging that "Utah law today [] allows a conviction to rest solely 
on an eyewitness identification"); see also State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272,1273 (Utah 
1975) (holding that single witness's "identification [testimony] was sufficient to 
connect defendant with the offense"); State v. Spencer, 28 Utah 2d 12, 497 P.2d 636, 
637 (1972). 
Notwithstanding, Defendant claims that Instruction 56 was erroneous 
because, "[b]y highlighting Creed's eyewitness testimony and identifying it 
specifically as testimony capable of convicting [Defendant] without any 
corroboration, Instruction 56 unduly bolstered Creed's eyewitness testimony." 
Aplt. Br. at 30. Such "undue emphasis would be inappropriate in any case," 
Defendant argues, "but it was particularly inappropriate here because the witness 
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discussed in Instruction 56 was the eyewitness/' and Instruction 56 "undermin[ed] 
whatever little protection the Long instruction normally gives by seeming to validate 
the jurors7 natural inclination to give eyewitness testimony 'great weight7 despite its 
'deep and generally unperceived flaws/" Id. at 27, 30 (quoting State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483,492 & n.5 (Utah 1986)). 
1. Studies addressing the fallibility of eyewitness testimony. 
As an initial matter, Defendant's reliance on case law and studies addressing 
the '"deep and generally unperceived flaws" in eyewitness identification testimony 
to support his claim of error in this case is misplaced. See Aplt. Br. at 27-30 
(discussing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,780 (Utah 1991), and State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 492 (Utah 1986); citing secondary sources). First, the empirical studies upon 
which these authorities rest "uniformly refer to the responsive characteristics of 
witnesses who are unfamiliar with the person they are to identify." Christopher M. 
Walters, Comment, "Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification" 
[hereinafter, Walters], 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1402,1422 (July 1985); see also Hager v. United 
States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004) (affirming exclusion of eyewitness 
testimony expert where "the studies on which [expert] would have relied concern 
the reliability of a stranger identification, not an identification of a person known to 
the witness, as in this case"). 
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In this case, however, Creed Law and Defendant were not strangers. In fact, it 
is undisputed that they had spent several hours together just hours before the 
burglary (R. 232:61). Moreover, during those hours together, Creed paid particular 
attention to Defendant and Phillips (R. 233:221). And "eyewitness identifications 
are extremely reliable [where] the crimes were committed by relatives, friends, or 
others who are known to the victims/' Samuel R. Gross, "Lost Lives: Miscarriages of 
justice in Capital Cases, 61 AUT Law & Contemp. Probs. 125,137 (Autumn 1998). 
Thus, the empirical studies upon which Defendant relies "have little proven bearing 
in a case" — such as this one —"where the witness has had some prior relationship 
with the defendant." Walters, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 1422.; see also United States v. Dobbs, 
449 F.3d 904, 909-10 (8th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing between "eyewitnesses being 
asked to recall their impression of a stranger during a short encounter in the 
emotionally charged context of an armed robbery" and eyewitnesses "already 
acquainted with" the suspects); cf Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (citing approvingly of study 
suggesting that one "factor[] which would bolster the reliability of visual 
identification" is "the witness's familiarity with the identified suspect"). 
More importantly, the court in Long identified two specific instructions that it 
concluded would adequately "sensitize the jury to the factors that empirical 
research have shown to be of importance in determining the accuracy of eyewitness 
28 
identifications, especially those that laypersons most likely would not appreciate/' 
Id. at 492. The first instruction was one proffered in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Id. at 493. The court found that the instruction "satisf[ies] most 
of the legitimate concerns about eyewitness testimony," even though "it does not 
cover several factors which more recent empirical research have shown to be 
important/7 Id. at 493-94. And, the court held, "the Telfaire instruction would seem 
to suffice as an adequate cautionary instruction under most circumstances/' Id. at 
494. 
The second instruction the court identified was a"more complete instruction 
that remedies many of the problems of the Telfaire ins true tion" and "is also more 
understandable." Id. at 494. Unlike the Telfaire instruction, the initial paragraphs of 
that instruction told the jury that the "identification testimony that you have heard 
was an expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the defendant not 
guilty, you need not believe that the identification witness was insincere, but merely 
that [the witness] was mistaken in his [her] belief or impression." Id. at 494 n.8 
(quoting R. Sanders, Helping the Jury Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The Need for 
Additional Safeguards, 12 Am.J.Crim.L. 189, 222-24 (1984)). "If used," the court 
concluded, "it would certainly satisfy our expressed concerns about the need for 
cautionary instructions." Id. at 494-95. 
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In this case, the trial court gave the second instruction identified in Long. 
Compare Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8 with R. 164-66 (Instruction 57). Thus, the Long 
instruction in this case was sufficient to "satisfy" the Long court's "expressed 
concerns about the need for cautionary instructions." Long, 721 P.2d at 494-95. 
The only question in this case, therefore, is whether Defendant can show that 
the trial court committed reversible error in supplementing that instruction with an 
instruction stating that a conviction could rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a 
single eyewitness. Defendant cannot make that showing here when the instructions 
are viewed as a whole. 
2. Defendant has not shown error, let alone prejudicial error, in 
the trial court's jury instructions. 
To succeed on his challenge to Instruction 56, Defendant must show both that 
the trial court erred in giving the instruction and that, "'absent the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant.'" State v. 
Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,126 (Utah App 1997) (quoting State v. White, 880 P.2d 18, 21 
(Utah App. 1994)) (additional citations omitted), 
However, as stated, '"[j]ury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to 
determine their adequacy.'" Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, f 31 (quoting Garcia, 2001 UT 
App 194 13) (alteration in original); accord Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ^  24; Harper, 2006 UT 
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App 178,114. Thus, this Court will not"isolate[] one sentence in one instruction 
while disregarding admonitions conveyed by other instructions." Taylor, 2005 UT 
40, f 24. "Jmy instructions will be affirmed 'when the instructions, taken as a 
whole, fairly tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have been.'" Hobbs, 2003 UT 
App 27, f 31 (quoting Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 13) (additional quotations and 
citations omitted) (second alteration in original). 
Under this standard, Defendant's claim fails. 
a. No error. 
Defendant's claim fails because he has not shown that the trial court erred in 
giving Instruction 56. 
First, considered in isolation, Instruction 56 sets forth a statement of law "in 
abstract generality." Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d at 197. It does not "purport to tell the jury" 
that Creed's testimony was credible. Id, Nor does it "comment[] on the quality" of 
Creed's testimony. Sanders, 496 P.2d at 275. 
But, as stated, jury instructions are not reviewed in isolation. See Taylor, 2005 
UT 40, f 24; Hmyer, 2006 UT App 178, \ 14; Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 31; Garcia, 
2001 UT App 19,^ 13. A defendant's challenge to a jury instruction cannot "isolate[] 
one sentence in one instruction while disregarding admonitions conveyed by other 
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instructions/' Taylor, 2005 UT 40, | 24. Yet, Defendant's claim rests on exactly that 
isolation here, disregarding all the other "admonitions conveyed by other 
instructions/' Id. 
Defendant disregards Instruction 1, which admonished the jury not to "pick 
out one [instruction] and ignore the rest," but, rather, to "[t]hink about each 
instruction in the context of all the others" (R. 124). He also disregards Instruction 3, 
which directed the jury that "[i]t is your role as the jury to . . . decide the factual 
issues," and admonished the jury not to be "influenced by what you think our 
personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based upon the law explained in 
these instructions and the evidence presented in court" (R. 125). 
Defendant then disregards Instruction 6, which reminded the jury that" [y]ou 
must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt" (R. 126). And he disregards Instructions 15,16,17,18, and 29, 
which addressed Defendant's presumption of innocence and the State's burden to 
prove Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 130-31,136). 
Defendant also disregards Instruction 11, which instructed the jury that 
"[ojnce evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it 
should be believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it" 
(R. 128). 
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Defendant disregards Instruction 12, which directed the jury that, "[a]s each 
witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is," taking into 
consideration the witness's "personal interest," "other bias," "demeanor," 
"consistency," and "knowledge and memory," as well as whether the testimony was 
"reasonable in light of human experience" (R. 129) (capitalization omitted). 
And, finally, Defendant disregards Instruction 57, the comprehensive Long 
instruction, which immediately followed the instruction he challenges. He ignores 
that Instruction 57 admonished the jury that" [a]n important question in this case is 
the identification of the defendant as the person who committed the crime." (R. 
164). He ignores that Instruction 57 also admonished the jury that the 
"identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe 
that the identification witness was [] insincere, but merely that the witness was 
mistaken in his or her belief or impression" (Id.). And he ignores that Instruction 57 
directed the jury, in deciding whether to believe Creed Law's eyewitness testimony, 
to consider the "[m]any factors" that may have "affected] the accuracy of [his] 
identification," including "the length of time the witness observed the actor," "the 
light or lack of light at the place and time of observation," the witness's "stress or 
fright at the time of observation," his "personal motivations, biases or prejudices," 
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"[wjhether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor/7 and "the 
mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time of the identification" 
(R. 164-66). 
Given the plethora of other instructions, Defendant's contention that 
Instruction 56 impermissibly bolstered Creed Law's eyewitness testimony is 
untenable. The instruction was just one of many that accurately instructed the jury 
on the law of the case. And the instructions as a whole adequately impressed upon 
the jury its need not only to determine each witness's credibility, but to especially 
consider Creed's credibility because "identification testimony [is] an expression of 
belief or impression by the witness," and the witness may have been "mistaken in 
his or her belief or impression" (R. 164). 
Consequently, Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred when it 
gave Instruction 56. 
b. No prejudice. 
But even if Defendant could show error in the giving of Instruction 56, he 
cannot show that he was prejudiced by the instruction. According to Defendant, 
Instruction 56 was prejudicial because "absent the undue influence of Instruction 56, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved Creed's 
eyewitness identification because it exhibits many features that diminish its 
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accuracy/' Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant argues that, "absent the undue influence of 
Instruction 56, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved 
the State's case because the story told by Creed and Porter was suspicious/' Id. at 
33. Defendant asserts that, "absent the undue influence of Instruction 56, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved the State's case because 
the evidence showed that it would have been difficult for [Defendants] to commit 
the burglary." Id. at 34. And, Defendant asserts that, "absent the undue influence of 
Instruction 56, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have disbelieved 
the State's case because the State, despite having several opportunities to 
corroborate Creed's identification during its investigation, elected not to." Id. at 35. 
Defendant's argument isolates Instruction 56 and seeks to attribute all of the 
jury's unfavorable deliberations to it. See Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 24 (holding that 
defendant's argument was "flawed because it isolates one sentence in one 
instruction while disregarding admonitions conveyed by other instructions"). Yet, 
as stated, the jury was given a plethora of other instructions emphasizing the State's 
burden of proof, the importance of determining witness credibility, and the factors 
relevant to determining the credibility of eyewitness testimony (R. 126,130-31,136 
(Instructions 6,15-18,29)). In light of these instructions, Defendant's contention that 
Instruction 56 clouded the jury's view of the entire case lacks merit. 
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In any event, the record demonstrates that Instruction 56 did not cloud the 
jury's view of Creed Law's eyewitness testimony, let alone any other evidence 
supporting Defendant's guilt. Two of the questions asked by the jury during 
deliberations addressed the Long instruction. See R. 234:58 ("Where are the outside 
lights in the yard where the fight was located?"); R. 234:61 ("Do we have to consider 
any of the factors for which there is no evidence?"). (R. 234:61). And the two other 
questions asked by the jury during deliberations addressed reasonable doubt. See 
Addendum C ("Can lack of evidence by considered when substantiating doubt?" 
and "If there is doubt are we or are we not required to give the defendants the 
benefit of the doubt?"). 
Given the first two questions, Instruction 56 clearly did not cause the jury to 
neglect its duty to carefully consider the credibility of Creed's eyewitness testimony 
under the Long instruction. And, given the last two questions, Instruction 56 did not 
cause the jury to neglect its duty to carefully consider whether the State had met its 
burden to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In sum, neither the jury instructions as a whole nor the record disclosing 
the jury's application of those instructions support Defendant's claim that he was 
prejudiced by Instruction 56. 
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CONCLUSION 
Neither the jury instructions as a whole nor the record concerning jury 
deliberations supports Defendant's contention that the trial court committed 
reversible error in giving Instruction 56. Thus, this Court should affirm Defendant's 
convictions. 
Respectfully submitted June 8, 2009. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
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RULE 19. INSTRUCTIONS 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may 
instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of 
proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the 
definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter 
stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the court 
in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. 
Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to each juror. 
At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a 
party may file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a 
requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the 
parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this 
requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law 
if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to 
giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to 
do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an interim 
written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the jury on the 
law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such requests shall 
be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of 
its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. Final 
instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The 
court shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its 
discretion, provide a copy to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions 
are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they 
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The 
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the 
jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to 
which the objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
given the jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any 
limitation upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION 
There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you 
from time to time during the trial. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given 
a copy of these instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to 
you, please follow along on your copy. Keep in mind the following points: 
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally important. 
Don't pick out one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context 
of all the others. 
Obey Instructions. You must obey the instructions. You are not allowed to reach 
decisions that go against the law. 
Gender -Singular/Plural. In these instructions, the masculine gender such as "he" 
or "him"includes the feminine "she" or "her" and the singular such as "defendant" 
includes the plural "defendants" when appropriate. 
Note Taking. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't 
let it distract you from following the evidence. The lawyers will review important 
evidence in their closing arguments and help you focus on that which is most 
relevant to your decision. I also caution that notes are not evidence. Use them only 
to aid personal memory or concentration. 
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case 
until you have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with 
the instructions on the law. Keep an open mind until then. 
2. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES 
From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch 
break, overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not 
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family, friends or even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying 
yourself as a juror so that people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle 
with the lawyers, the parties, die witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You 
may say "hello", or exchange similar greetings or civilities with these persons, but don't 
engage in conversations. Don't accept from or give to any of these persons any favors, 
however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read about this case in the newspaper 
or listen to any reports on television or radio. These restraints are necessary for a fair 
trial. 
3. THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS 
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important 
roles in the trial. 
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and 
instruct the jury on the LAW that it must apply. 
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law ajid decide the factual issues. 
Factual issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or 
similar things concerning which evidence will be presented. 
Lawvers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and 
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also try to 
persuade you to accept his version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of his 
client. 
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that 
is your role. Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you 
decide the case based upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence 
presented in court. 
4. OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL 
The trial will generally proceed as follows: 
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Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and 
indicate what they think the evidence will show. 
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by 
the defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the 
witnesses and seeing the exhibits offered by the other side. 
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will 
supplement these written instructions and review them with you. 
Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. 
They will share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to 
the law and how they think you should decide the case. 
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and 
deliberate until you reach a verdict. 
5. THE CHARGE(S) and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The 
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be 
read or summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in 
mind that the defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The 
defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge. 
6. WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE? 
You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be 
based only on the evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on 
speculation. Don't guess about any fact. However, you may draw reasonable 
inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions from the evidence presented. 
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7. WHAT IS EVIDENCE? 
Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed 
fact. It can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or 
certain qualified opinions, or any combination of these things. Some times the lawyers 
may agree that certain facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as 
having been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known 
fact. If this happens, I will explain how you should treat it, 
8. OPINION TESTIMONY 
Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A 
person who by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science 
or profession, may give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) 
is also allowed to express an opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is 
helpful to understanding his testimony or the case. You are not bound to believe 
anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight 
you think it deserves. 
9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE? 
I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tellyou about some things 
which do not qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not 
consider in reaching your verdict. 
Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant 
of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. 
Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the 
range of potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment 
the defendant may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based 
upon the applicable law. 
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Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't 
consider that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused 
person has the right not to testify and you should not draw any negative 
inferences based upon the reliance on this right. 
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to 
give you a preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the 
evidence from their viewpoint. 
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. 
You should not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make 
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things 
or articles not produced in court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for 
you. Don't look for information in law books, dictionaries or public or private 
records which are not produced in court. 
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or 
read about this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court 
communication. You must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and 
received in court. 
10. THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE 
Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for 
the jury to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on 
objections. If an objection is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not 
consider it. If an objection is OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may 
consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you should ignore it. 
11. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it 
should be believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. 
jurcnrains 6/15/00 Page 6 
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. 
Review all the evidence. Don't imagine things which have no evidence to back them 
up. Consider the evidence fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side. 
12. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS 
As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may 
help you to ask yourself questions such as these: 
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial 
comes out? 
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain 
way? 
Demeanor: What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct 
while answering questions? 
Consistency. Did die witness make conflicting statements or contradict other 
evidence? 
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the 
facts and the ability to remember them? 
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe 
one witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest 
convictions. 
13. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY? 
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything 
relevant to the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining 
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testimony from that witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event 
you should give it what weight you think it deserves. 
14. QUESTIONS BY JURORS DURING THE TRIAL 
A jury member may direct questions to the judge or to a witness by writing the 
question on a piece of paper and handing it to the bailiff who will hand it to me. I will 
share the same with the lawyers who have the right to express an opinion as to whether 
it is proper. If the question is not one that is allowed under the rules of evidence or is 
otherwise improper, I will tell you. Otherwise, the question will generally be allowed. 
I remind you that the lawyers are trained in asking questions that will produce 
the evidence necessary to decide this case. However, if you feel there is something 
important that has been missed or that needs clarification, you may ask a question by 
complying with the procedure outlined in this instruction. 
15. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY? 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in 
this case. The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by 
assuming it. According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a humane provision of the law 
intended to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
16. HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? 
Before you can give up your assumption the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it. 
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17. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and coinmon sense rather than 
speculation, supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make 
a reasonable person hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is 
such as would be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and impartial 
consideration of all the evidence, and must arise from the evidence or lack of evidence 
in the case. 
18. HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT 
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you 
must determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask 
yourselves if the doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not 
require that the evidence dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it 
dispel all reasonable doubt. That is what is meant by the p i^rase "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt". 
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19. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE 
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages 
which contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. 
These additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-eight (28). We will 
read those after completing our review of the following instructions which relate 
essentially to the procedure that you should follow. 
20. WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM 
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to 
discuss this case: 
a. all exhibits admitted in evidence; 
b. your notes (if any); 
c. your copy of these instructions; and 
d. the verdict form or forms. 
21. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM 
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in 
charge. This person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair." The Chair's duties are: 
a. To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak; 
b. to represent the jury in any communications you make; and 
c. to sign your verdict and bring it back in court. 
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In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no 
more power than any other juror. 
22. CONSIDER EACH OTHER'S OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN 
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION 
It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make 
an emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain 
verdict. When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block 
appropriate consideration of the case. Use your common memory, your common 
understanding and your common sense. Talk about the case with each other as you 
ponder and deliberate. 
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with 
everyone else. However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other 
jurors. If you are persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate 
to change your mind. Help each other arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance 
or some form of decision-making other than honest deliberation. 
23. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION 
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give 
it to the bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question 
whenever appropriate. However, these instructions should contain all the information 
you need to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. 
24. FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE 
Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this 
case as a forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of 
expressing individual or collective views about anything other than the guilt or 
innocence of this defendant. Your verdict should reflect the facts as found by you 
applied to the law as explained in these instructions and should not be distorted by any 
outside factors or objectives. 
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The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You 
will contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case 
and return a just and proper verdict. 
25. REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must 
agree. When you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work 
is finished. 
26. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict 
form which corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to 
return to court. 
27. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict ro the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of 
you about it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury 
box and you may leave at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to 
watch the rest of the proceedings, which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you 
are not required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when 
you don't want to do that, please tell the Court Clerk. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J*± 
It is your duty to give separate, personal consideration to the case of each individual 
defendant. When you do so, you should analyze what the evidence in the case shows with 
respect to that individual, leaving out entirely any consideration of evidence admitted solely 
against any other defendant. Each defendant is entitled to have his or her case determined 
from evidence as to his or her own acts, statements and conduct and any other evidence in the 
case which may be specifically applicable to him or to her. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ? 
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only 
necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the State's proof 
must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the 
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, 
and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, 
based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a 
real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ^ 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. Each charge and 
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as 
to any other offense charged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3/ 
Before you can convict the defendant, JOSHUA M. PHILLIPS, of the offense of 
Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of November, 2006, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, JOSHUA M. PHILLIPS, entered or remained in the dwelling of Dennis 
and Karey Law; and 
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and 
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a theft; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant or 
another participant in the crime either: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, of the offense of 
Aggravated Burglary as charged in count J of the information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of November, 2006, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, entered or remained in the dwelling of 
Dennis and Karey Law; and 
2. That the defendant entered or remained unlawfully; and 
3. That the defendant entered or remained intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant entered or remained with the intent to commit a theft; and 
5. That in attempting, committing or fleeing from a burglary, the defendant or 
another participant in the crime either: 
(a) caused bodily injury to any person who was not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(b) used or threatened the immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possessed or attempted to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this pase, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
& 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of Burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
A person is guilty of Aggravated Burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a 
burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person 
who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3*f 
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon the premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the entry .or remaining are not open to the public and when the 
actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
"Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at 
night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
"Enter" means intrusion of any part of the body or intrusion of any physical object 
under the control of the actor. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, 
or, without legal justification, or, illegal. 
A "Participant" is a person who could be charged as a party to the crime and does not 
include the victim of the crime or the person against whom the crime is committed. 
Instruction 3 ^ 
The State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or carried a 
firearm "during and in relation to" the crimes charged in the Information. The words "in relation; 
to" mean that the firearm had a role in, facilitated, or increased the likelihood of success of the 
crimes charged in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ^ 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, 
or a facsimile or representation of the item, .and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that the actor is in control of such an item. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creatds or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 7 
When a person unlawfully enters a building with the intent to commit a theft, the crime of 
burglary is committed and successful completion of the intended theft need not be shown. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 $ 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent jvith respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3? 
"On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or is near the day alleged in 
the information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. fr° 
To constitute the crime charged in the information there must be the joint operation of 
two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with the culpable mental state 
required for such offense. 
ftConduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is 
capable of acting. 
INSTRUCTION NO. iff 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and connotes a purpose in so 
acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. fy% 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or 
fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need npt be proven. The motive of an 
accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of 
state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if. acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, that person engages in conduct constituting 
a substantial step towards the commission of the offense. 
Conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense. No defense to the offense of attempt arises because the 
offense attempted was actually committed or due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense 
could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to 
be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. rf$ 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of theft if that person obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
INSTRUCTION NO. tfCr 
Before you can convict the defendant, JOSHUA M. PHILLIPS, of the offense of Theft 
as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of November, 2006, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, JOSHUA M. PHILLIPS, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over 
the property of Dennis and Karey Law; and 
2. That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
3. That the value of the property was or exceeded $5,000.00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Theft as charged in count II of the infqrmation. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Hi 
Before you can convict the defendant. BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, of the offense of 
Theft as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of November, 2006, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of Dennis and Karey Law; and 
2. That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
3. That the value of the property was or exceeded $5,000.00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Theft as charged in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ?Q 
"Property" means anything of value, including tangible personal property. 
"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of possession or of 
some other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object to withhold property 
permanently or for so extended a period or to use under circumstances that a substantial portion 
of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to restore the property 
only upon payment of a reward or other compensation, or to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ f 
In connection of the charge of Theft, the measure of the value is its fair market value at 
the time and place of the theft. 
Market value is the price a well informed buyer would pay to a well informed seller 
where neither is under compulsion to enter into the transaction. 
The owner of an article of property is a competent witness as to its value and any such 
expression of opinion may be considered by you in determining value. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £° 
A person commits Criminal Mischief if the person intentionally damages, defaces, or 
destroys the property of another. 
INSTRUCTION NO 5( 
Before you can convict the defendant, JOSHUA M. PHILLIPS, of the crime of 
Criminal Mischief, as charged in count III of the Information, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of November, 2006, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, JOSHUA M. PHILLIPS, as a party to the offense, intentionally damaged, 
defaced, or destroyed the property of Dennis and Karey Law; and 
2. That the defendant's conduct caused pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of 
$1,000.00 but is less than $5,000.00 in value. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
fmd the defendant guilty of Criminal Mischief as charged in count III of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
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INSTRUCTION NO 5^U 
Before you can convict the defendant, BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, of the crime of 
Criminal Mischief, as charged in count III of the Information, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of November, 2006, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL, as a party to the offense, intentionally 
damaged, defaced, or destroyed the property of Dennis and Karey Law; and 
2. That the defendant's conduct caused pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of 
$1,000.00 but is less than $5,000.00 in value. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Criminal Mischief as charged in count III of the information. If, on 
the other hand, >ou are not convinced be\ond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 3 
In connection with the charge of Criminal Mischief, the value of any item includes the 
measurable value of the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to replace or restore the 
items. 
INSTRUCTION NO. u ' 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and has 
the right to go upon the witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. The law expressly 
provides, however, that no presumption adverse to him is to ari^e from the mere fact that he 
does not place himself on the witness stand. If he is satisfied with the evidence which has 
been given, there is no occasion for him to add thereto. 
In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of 
the evidence and upon failure, if any, of the State to prove every essential element of the 
charge against him. No lack of testimony on defendant's part v/ill correct a failure of proof by 
the State so as to support by itself a finding against him on any such essential element. 
In this case the mere fact that this defendant has not availed himself of the privilege 
which the law gives him should not prejudice him in any way. it should not be considered as 
any indication either of his guilt or his innocence. The failure of the defendant to testify is not 
even a circumstance against him and no presumption of guilt car; be indulged. 
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INSTKUCirON N<)..._55. 
The defendant in litis ca.se has introduced evidence tending to show that he was not 
prcMcn( HI ihc time and place ofthe commission of the alleged offense for which he is 
here on trial. IC after a-consideration of all ihc evidence, you have a reasonable doubt 
thai the defendant was present at the time the crime was committed, he is entitled to an 
acquiltal. 
Yon ore instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish the 
defence of alibi by a preponderance or greater wvd<>hl of evidence. The laws of Utah 
require the defendant lo bring forward some substantial evidence which tends to show 
that he was uol present at the time and place of the commission ofthe alleged offense, If 
rhc defendant has done this, and if sue!) evidence when considered in connection with all 
other evidence in this case wises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt you must 
acquit him. 
INSTRUCTION NO. $(p 
A conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 7 
An important question in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who 
committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not 
only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the person who committed 
the crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, 
you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was not insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his or her 
belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the 
prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In 
answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor; 
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation 
(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the 
observation; 
(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of the witness to observe 
the person committing the crime. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In 
answering this question, you should consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired 
by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) fatigue or injury. 
3. Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification 
by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same 
race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the witness completely the product of 
the witness' own memory? In answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the original observation of the 
witness and the identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time of the 
identification: 
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to photographs, or to any other 
information or influence that may have affected the independence of the 
identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(d) any instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant; 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness 
for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a 
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable that an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made from seeing the person are 
generally more reliable that identifications made from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and from the 
defense, and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the 
crime charged, and you find all of the other elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty of the crime charged. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was the person who committed the crime charged you must find the defendant not guilty of the 
crime charged 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ g 
Members of the Jury: 
I am going to ask that you continue your deliberations. I have prepared a few 
additional comments that I would like you to consider as you do so. 
Those for conviction ought seriously to ask themselves again, and most thoughtfully, 
whether they do not have a reason to doubt the correctness of a judgment that is not shared 
by one or more of their fellow jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and 
sufficiency of evidence that has failed to convince one or more of their fellow jurors beyond 
a reasonable doubt. And those for acquittal ought seriously to ask themselves again, and 
most thoughtfully, whether the doubt in their mind is a reasonable one since it appears to 
make no effective impression upon the minds of one or more equally conscientious fellow 
jurors, wTho bear the same responsibility, serve under the same oath, and have heard the same 
evidence with, we may assume, the same attention to detail and desire to arrive at the truth. 
You should, however, all bear in mind at all times that no juror is expected to, or 
should, yield a conscientious conviction that he or she may have as to the weight of the 
evidence. But, it is your duty to reach a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your 
conscientious conviction. 
I will now ask that you retire once again and continue your deliberations with these 
additional comments in mind and that you apply them in conjunction with the instructions 
that I have previously given to you. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the 
occasion may require and should take all the time that you feel may be necessary. 
Addendum C 
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ANSWER 
Yoif should consider the totality-bfihe evidence and apply it to the factors and give what 
weidht it deserves: if anv. To the extent you find no evidence as to a factor, you need 
not ,consiaer tnat ractor in your deliberations 
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